238666f9cc
- use `127.0.0.1` as fallback ip when `NODE_ENV === 'development'` in both `getIpFromHeaders` and `getIpFromRequest` - preserve `unknown` fallback in production to suspend rate limiting when no trusted proxy is configured - update comments to reflect environment-specific behaviour
162 lines
6.5 KiB
JavaScript
162 lines
6.5 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* In-memory rate limiter
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* Stores counters in a Map — resets on server restart, no DB required.
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*/
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// Persist the store on globalThis so that module-cache invalidation (e.g. during
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// Next.js hot reload) does not silently reset all counters within the same process.
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// CRITICAL LIMITATION: this Map is process-local. In serverless or multi-worker
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// deployments every instance maintains its own store and rate limits do not
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// distribute across instances. For production deployments with multiple workers
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// replace this Map with a shared atomic store (e.g. Redis / Upstash).
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const STORE_KEY = Symbol.for('__ZEN_RATE_LIMIT_STORE__');
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if (!globalThis[STORE_KEY]) globalThis[STORE_KEY] = new Map();
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/** @type {Map<string, { count: number, windowStart: number, windowMs: number, blockedUntil: number|null }>} */
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const store = globalThis[STORE_KEY];
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// Purge expired entries every 10 minutes to avoid memory leak
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const cleanup = setInterval(() => {
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const now = Date.now();
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for (const [key, entry] of store.entries()) {
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const windowExpired = now > entry.windowStart + entry.windowMs;
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const blockExpired = !entry.blockedUntil || now > entry.blockedUntil;
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if (windowExpired && blockExpired) {
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store.delete(key);
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}
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}
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}, 10 * 60 * 1000);
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// Allow garbage collection in test/serverless environments
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if (cleanup.unref) cleanup.unref();
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/**
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* Rate limit presets per action.
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* maxAttempts : number of requests allowed in the window
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* windowMs : rolling window duration
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* blockMs : how long to block once the limit is exceeded
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*/
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export const RATE_LIMITS = {
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login: { maxAttempts: 5, windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, blockMs: 30 * 60 * 1000 },
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register: { maxAttempts: 5, windowMs: 60 * 60 * 1000, blockMs: 60 * 60 * 1000 },
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forgot_password: { maxAttempts: 3, windowMs: 60 * 60 * 1000, blockMs: 60 * 60 * 1000 },
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reset_password: { maxAttempts: 5, windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, blockMs: 30 * 60 * 1000 },
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verify_email: { maxAttempts: 10, windowMs: 60 * 60 * 1000, blockMs: 30 * 60 * 1000 },
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api: { maxAttempts: 120, windowMs: 60 * 1000, blockMs: 5 * 60 * 1000 },
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};
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/**
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* Check whether a given identifier is allowed for an action, and record the attempt.
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*
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* @param {string} identifier - IP address or user ID
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* @param {string} action - Key from RATE_LIMITS (e.g. 'login')
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* @returns {{ allowed: boolean, retryAfterMs?: number, remaining?: number }}
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*/
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export function checkRateLimit(identifier, action) {
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const config = RATE_LIMITS[action];
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if (!config) return { allowed: true };
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const key = `${action}:${identifier}`;
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const now = Date.now();
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let entry = store.get(key);
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// Still blocked
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if (entry?.blockedUntil && now < entry.blockedUntil) {
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return { allowed: false, retryAfterMs: entry.blockedUntil - now };
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}
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// Start a fresh window (first request, or previous window has expired)
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if (!entry || now > entry.windowStart + entry.windowMs) {
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store.set(key, { count: 1, windowStart: now, windowMs: config.windowMs, blockedUntil: null });
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return { allowed: true, remaining: config.maxAttempts - 1 };
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}
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// Increment counter in the current window
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entry.count += 1;
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if (entry.count > config.maxAttempts) {
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entry.blockedUntil = now + config.blockMs;
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store.set(key, entry);
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return { allowed: false, retryAfterMs: config.blockMs };
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}
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store.set(key, entry);
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return { allowed: true, remaining: config.maxAttempts - entry.count };
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}
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/**
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* Return true only when the string resembles a valid IPv4 or IPv6 address.
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* This prevents arbitrary attacker-supplied strings from being used as
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* rate-limit identifiers (which could allow bucket manipulation).
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* @param {string|null|undefined} ip
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* @returns {boolean}
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*/
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function isValidIp(ip) {
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if (!ip || typeof ip !== 'string') return false;
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// IPv4 — four decimal octets, each 0-255
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if (/^(\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}$/.test(ip)) {
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return ip.split('.').every(octet => parseInt(octet, 10) <= 255);
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}
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// IPv6 — simplified structural check (colons + hex groups)
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return /^[0-9a-fA-F:]+$/.test(ip) && ip.includes(':');
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}
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/**
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* Extract the client IP from Next.js headers() (server actions).
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*
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* X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP are only trusted when ZEN_TRUST_PROXY=true is
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* explicitly set, confirming a trusted reverse proxy populates those headers.
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* Without this flag the headers are fully attacker-controlled and MUST NOT be
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* used as rate-limit keys — an attacker would trivially rotate identifiers.
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*
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* Set ZEN_TRUST_PROXY=true only when a verified reverse proxy (e.g. Nginx,
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* Cloudflare, AWS ALB) strips and rewrites forwarded headers before they reach
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* this application.
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*
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* @param {import('next/headers').ReadonlyHeaders} headersList
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* @returns {string}
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*/
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export function getIpFromHeaders(headersList) {
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if (process.env.ZEN_TRUST_PROXY === 'true') {
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const forwarded = headersList.get('x-forwarded-for')?.split(',')[0]?.trim();
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if (forwarded && isValidIp(forwarded)) return forwarded;
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const realIp = headersList.get('x-real-ip')?.trim();
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if (realIp && isValidIp(realIp)) return realIp;
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}
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// In development, use loopback so rate limiting stays active and the
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// "IP cannot be determined" warning is not emitted.
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// In production without a trusted proxy, return 'unknown' to suspend rate
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// limiting rather than collapse all traffic into one shared bucket.
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// Configure ZEN_TRUST_PROXY=true behind a verified reverse proxy.
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return process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development' ? '127.0.0.1' : 'unknown';
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}
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/**
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* Extract the client IP from a Next.js Request object (API routes).
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* See getIpFromHeaders for the full trust-proxy rationale.
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* @param {Request} request
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* @returns {string}
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*/
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export function getIpFromRequest(request) {
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if (process.env.ZEN_TRUST_PROXY === 'true') {
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const forwarded = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-for')?.split(',')[0]?.trim();
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if (forwarded && isValidIp(forwarded)) return forwarded;
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const realIp = request.headers.get('x-real-ip')?.trim();
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if (realIp && isValidIp(realIp)) return realIp;
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}
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return process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development' ? '127.0.0.1' : 'unknown';
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}
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/**
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* Format a block duration in human-readable French.
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* @param {number} ms
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* @returns {string}
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*/
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export function formatRetryAfter(ms) {
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const seconds = Math.ceil(ms / 1000);
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if (seconds < 60) return `${seconds} secondes`;
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const minutes = Math.ceil(seconds / 60);
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if (minutes < 60) return `${minutes} minute${minutes > 1 ? 's' : ''}`;
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const hours = Math.ceil(minutes / 60);
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return `${hours} heure${hours > 1 ? 's' : ''}`;
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}
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