Files
core/src/features/auth/actions.js
T

362 lines
12 KiB
JavaScript

'use server';
import { register, login, requestPasswordReset, resetPassword, verifyUserEmail } from './auth.js';
import { validateSession, deleteSession } from './session.js';
import { verifyEmailToken, verifyResetToken, sendVerificationEmail, sendPasswordResetEmail } from './email.js';
import { fail } from '@zen/core/shared/logger';
import { cookies, headers } from 'next/headers';
import { getSessionCookieName, getPublicBaseUrl } from '@zen/core/shared/config';
import { checkRateLimit, getIpFromHeaders, formatRetryAfter } from '@zen/core/shared/rate-limit';
/**
* Errors that are safe to surface verbatim to the client (e.g. "token expired").
* All other errors — including library-layer and database errors — must be caught,
* logged server-side only, and replaced with a generic message to prevent internal
* detail disclosure.
*/
class UserFacingError extends Error {
constructor(message) {
super(message);
this.name = 'UserFacingError';
}
}
async function getClientIp() {
const h = await headers();
return getIpFromHeaders(h);
}
// Emitted at most once per process lifetime to avoid log flooding while still
// alerting operators that per-IP rate limiting is inactive for server actions.
let _rateLimitUnavailableWarned = false;
/**
* Apply per-IP rate limiting only when a real IP address is available.
*
* When IP resolves to 'unknown' (no trusted proxy configured), every caller
* shares the single bucket keyed '<action>:unknown'. A single attacker can
* exhaust that bucket in 5 requests and impose a 30-minute denial-of-service
* on every legitimate user. Rate limiting is therefore suspended for the
* 'unknown' case and a one-time operator warning is emitted instead,
* mirroring the identical policy applied to API routes in router.js.
*/
function enforceRateLimit(ip, action) {
if (ip === 'unknown') {
if (!_rateLimitUnavailableWarned) {
_rateLimitUnavailableWarned = true;
fail(
'Rate limiting inactive (server actions): client IP cannot be determined. ' +
'Set ZEN_TRUST_PROXY=true behind a verified reverse proxy to enable per-IP rate limiting.'
);
}
return null;
}
return checkRateLimit(ip, action);
}
/**
* Validate anti-bot fields submitted with forms.
* - _hp : honeypot field — must be empty
* - _t : form load timestamp (ms) — submission must be at least 1.5 s after page
* load AND no more than MAX_FORM_AGE_MS in the past. Both a lower bound
* (prevents instant automated submission) and an upper bound (prevents the
* trivial bypass of supplying an arbitrary past timestamp such as _t=1) are
* enforced. Future timestamps are also rejected.
*/
function validateAntiBotFields(formData) {
const honeypot = formData.get('_hp');
if (honeypot && honeypot.length > 0) {
return { valid: false, error: 'Requête invalide' };
}
const MIN_ELAPSED_MS = 1_500;
const MAX_FORM_AGE_MS = 10 * 60 * 1_000;
const now = Date.now();
const t = parseInt(formData.get('_t') || '0', 10);
const elapsed = now - t;
if (t === 0 || t > now || elapsed < MIN_ELAPSED_MS || elapsed > MAX_FORM_AGE_MS) {
return { valid: false, error: 'Requête invalide' };
}
return { valid: true };
}
const COOKIE_NAME = getSessionCookieName();
export async function registerAction(formData) {
try {
const botCheck = validateAntiBotFields(formData);
if (!botCheck.valid) return { success: false, error: botCheck.error };
const ip = await getClientIp();
const rl = enforceRateLimit(ip, 'register');
if (rl && !rl.allowed) {
return { success: false, error: `Trop de tentatives. Réessayez dans ${formatRetryAfter(rl.retryAfterMs)}.` };
}
const email = formData.get('email');
const password = formData.get('password');
const name = formData.get('name');
const result = await register({ email, password, name });
await sendVerificationEmail(result.user.email, result.verificationToken, getPublicBaseUrl());
return {
success: true,
message: 'Compte créé avec succès. Consultez votre e-mail pour vérifier votre compte.',
user: result.user
};
} catch (error) {
// Never return raw error.message to the client — library and database errors
// (e.g. unique-constraint violations) expose internal table names and schema.
fail(`Auth: registerAction error: ${error.message}`);
return { success: false, error: 'Une erreur interne est survenue. Veuillez réessayer.' };
}
}
export async function loginAction(formData) {
try {
const botCheck = validateAntiBotFields(formData);
if (!botCheck.valid) return { success: false, error: botCheck.error };
const ip = await getClientIp();
const rl = enforceRateLimit(ip, 'login');
if (rl && !rl.allowed) {
return { success: false, error: `Trop de tentatives. Réessayez dans ${formatRetryAfter(rl.retryAfterMs)}.` };
}
const email = formData.get('email');
const password = formData.get('password');
const result = await login({ email, password });
// An HttpOnly cookie is the only safe transport for session tokens; setting it
// here keeps the token out of any JavaScript-readable response payload.
const cookieStore = await cookies();
cookieStore.set(COOKIE_NAME, result.session.token, {
httpOnly: true,
secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
sameSite: 'lax',
maxAge: 60 * 60 * 24 * 30,
path: '/'
});
return {
success: true,
message: 'Connexion réussie',
user: result.user
};
} catch (error) {
fail(`Auth: loginAction error: ${error.message}`);
return { success: false, error: 'Identifiants invalides ou erreur interne. Veuillez réessayer.' };
}
}
/**
* Set session cookie after verifying the token is a genuine live session.
*
* Client-callable. Without server-side token validation an attacker could
* supply any arbitrary string (including a stolen token for another user)
* and have it written as the HttpOnly session cookie, bypassing the protection
* HttpOnly is intended to provide. The token is therefore validated against
* the session store before the cookie is written.
*/
export async function setSessionCookie(token) {
try {
if (!token || typeof token !== 'string' || token.trim() === '') {
return { success: false, error: 'Jeton de session invalide' };
}
const session = await validateSession(token);
if (!session) {
return { success: false, error: 'Session invalide ou expirée' };
}
const cookieStore = await cookies();
cookieStore.set(COOKIE_NAME, token, {
httpOnly: true,
secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
sameSite: 'lax',
maxAge: 60 * 60 * 24 * 30,
path: '/'
});
return { success: true };
} catch (error) {
fail(`Auth: setSessionCookie error: ${error.message}`);
return { success: false, error: 'Une erreur interne est survenue' };
}
}
/**
* Re-validates the token before extending its cookie lifetime so that expired
* or revoked tokens cannot have their cookie window reopened by replay.
*/
export async function refreshSessionCookie(token) {
try {
if (!token || typeof token !== 'string' || token.trim() === '') {
return { success: false, error: 'Jeton de session invalide' };
}
const session = await validateSession(token);
if (!session) {
return { success: false, error: 'Session invalide ou expirée' };
}
const cookieStore = await cookies();
cookieStore.set(COOKIE_NAME, token, {
httpOnly: true,
secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
sameSite: 'lax',
maxAge: 60 * 60 * 24 * 30,
path: '/'
});
return { success: true };
} catch (error) {
fail(`Auth: refreshSessionCookie error: ${error.message}`);
return { success: false, error: 'Une erreur interne est survenue' };
}
}
export async function logoutAction() {
try {
const cookieStore = await cookies();
const token = cookieStore.get(COOKIE_NAME)?.value;
if (token) {
await deleteSession(token);
}
cookieStore.delete(COOKIE_NAME);
return { success: true, message: 'Déconnexion réussie' };
} catch (error) {
fail(`Auth: logoutAction error: ${error.message}`);
return { success: false, error: 'Une erreur interne est survenue. Veuillez réessayer.' };
}
}
export async function getSession() {
try {
const cookieStore = await cookies();
const token = cookieStore.get(COOKIE_NAME)?.value;
if (!token) return null;
const result = await validateSession(token);
if (result && result.sessionRefreshed) {
await refreshSessionCookie(token);
}
return result;
} catch (error) {
fail(`Auth: session validation error: ${error.message}`);
return null;
}
}
export async function forgotPasswordAction(formData) {
try {
const botCheck = validateAntiBotFields(formData);
if (!botCheck.valid) return { success: false, error: botCheck.error };
const ip = await getClientIp();
const rl = enforceRateLimit(ip, 'forgot_password');
if (rl && !rl.allowed) {
return { success: false, error: `Trop de tentatives. Réessayez dans ${formatRetryAfter(rl.retryAfterMs)}.` };
}
const email = formData.get('email');
const result = await requestPasswordReset(email);
if (result.token) {
await sendPasswordResetEmail(email, result.token, getPublicBaseUrl());
}
return {
success: true,
message: 'Si un compte existe avec cet e-mail, vous recevrez un lien pour réinitialiser votre mot de passe.'
};
} catch (error) {
fail(`Auth: forgotPasswordAction error: ${error.message}`);
return { success: false, error: 'Une erreur interne est survenue. Veuillez réessayer.' };
}
}
export async function resetPasswordAction(formData) {
try {
const ip = await getClientIp();
const rl = enforceRateLimit(ip, 'reset_password');
if (rl && !rl.allowed) {
return { success: false, error: `Trop de tentatives. Réessayez dans ${formatRetryAfter(rl.retryAfterMs)}.` };
}
const email = formData.get('email');
const token = formData.get('token');
const newPassword = formData.get('newPassword');
// Throw UserFacingError so the specific message reaches the client while
// unexpected system errors are sanitized in the catch below.
const isValid = await verifyResetToken(email, token);
if (!isValid) {
throw new UserFacingError('Jeton de réinitialisation invalide ou expiré');
}
await resetPassword({ email, token, newPassword });
return {
success: true,
message: 'Mot de passe réinitialisé avec succès. Vous pouvez maintenant vous connecter avec votre nouveau mot de passe.'
};
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof UserFacingError) {
return { success: false, error: error.message };
}
fail(`Auth: resetPasswordAction error: ${error.message}`);
return { success: false, error: 'Une erreur interne est survenue. Veuillez réessayer.' };
}
}
export async function verifyEmailAction(formData) {
try {
const ip = await getClientIp();
const rl = enforceRateLimit(ip, 'verify_email');
if (rl && !rl.allowed) {
return { success: false, error: `Trop de tentatives. Réessayez dans ${formatRetryAfter(rl.retryAfterMs)}.` };
}
const email = formData.get('email');
const token = formData.get('token');
const isValid = await verifyEmailToken(email, token);
if (!isValid) {
throw new UserFacingError('Jeton de vérification invalide ou expiré');
}
const { findOne } = await import('../../core/database/crud.js');
const user = await findOne('zen_auth_users', { email });
if (!user) {
throw new UserFacingError('Utilisateur introuvable');
}
await verifyUserEmail(user.id);
return {
success: true,
message: 'E-mail vérifié avec succès. Vous pouvez maintenant vous connecter.'
};
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof UserFacingError) {
return { success: false, error: error.message };
}
fail(`Auth: verifyEmailAction error: ${error.message}`);
return { success: false, error: 'Une erreur interne est survenue. Veuillez réessayer.' };
}
}